






















Job Creation, Job Destruction and Voting 













Department of Economics 
Aarhus School of Business 
 Job Creation, Job Destruction and Voting
Behavior in Poland∗
Valérie Smeets†and Frédéric Warzynski‡
Abstract
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of job creation and job destruc-
tion on the voting patterns of individuals in Poland during the
1997 and 2001 parliamentary elections. First, we link the votes
for the left wing party to the unemployment rate and the job cre-
ation and destruction rates in the constituency. We show that
the job destruction rate and unemployment rate has a positive
eﬀect on the votes for the SLD, while the job creation rate has
a negative eﬀect. Second, we look at the eﬀect of the change
in job creation and job destruction rates on the change in the
votes for individual candidates. We ﬁnd that incumbents from
the former right wing coalition received less votes if excess job
reallocation had increased in their constituency. Therefore, the
paper provides evidence that job ﬂows have a strong impact on
voting patterns and that the balance between the positive and
negative eﬀects of reforms determine to a large extent the polit-
ical outcome.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the 1940s, the famous Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter introduced
the notion of creative destruction in his book, Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy. In his words:
“The fundamental impulse that keeps the capital engine in mo-
tion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of
production and transportation, the new markets..[The process]
incessantly revolutionizes from within, incessantly destroying the
old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Cre-
ative Destruction is the essential fact of capitalism.”, Schumpeter
(1942)
Theoretical and empirical work has rediscovered this notion at the begin-
ning of the 1990s, leading to a theory of Schumpeterian growth, formalizing
the main ideas in Schumpeter’s work.
There is now considerable evidence that the reallocation process has im-
portant eﬃciency consequences and contributes signiﬁcantly to productivity
growth. For example, in the US, half of total factor productivity growth over
the course of a decade can be accounted for by the reallocation of outputs
and inputs away from less productive to more productive businesses (Halti-
wanger, 2000). In Poland, Warzynski (2003) found a signiﬁcant and positive
relationship between labor productivity growth and excess job reallocation.
However, the process of creative destruction can also have important
social consequences if workers are not reallocated smoothly from old jobs to
the new ones. If individuals have outdated skills, it is likely that ﬁnding a
new employer will be very diﬃcult.
In transition countries, resources were allocated ineﬃciently and the pro-
duction processes were in many cases obsolete. When trade was liberalized
and foreign investment permitted, ﬁrms lost market share and major re-
structuring programs were launched, leading to a considerable amount of
job displacements.
Transition inevitably led to the constitution of a group of winners and
losers. An intense debate at the beginning of transition opposed those who
favored a big bang approach to reforms, to those defending the more grad-
ualistic approach (see Dewatripont and Roland, 1995). While the former
2stressed the window of opportunities which allowed radical reforms to be
undertaken, the latter focused on the importance of political constraints.
In a democratic society, politicians are accountable for the consequences of
reforms. Therefore, a big bang strategy will create a large proportion of
losers, who will oppose further reforms. Gradualism will then be a more
viable strategy.
On the one hand, new opportunities allowed the creation of new ﬁrms,
which started developing new products. On the other hand, individuals who
were working in ﬁrms and who lost their jobs were very dissatisﬁed with the
result of the reforms. During election time, losers from the transition process
have the right to translate their dissatisfaction in their votes. Therefore, very
high levels of job destruction are likely to be associated with a high level
of votes for parties opposing fast reforms, while higher job creation will be
associated with more votes for the reforming parties, as individuals working
in new ﬁrms are more likely to bring their votes to the parties that created
the new opportunities.
This paper analyzes the eﬀect of job creation and job destruction on the
voting patterns of individuals in Poland during the 1997 and 2001 parliamen-
tary elections. In September 2001, Poles voted massively for the socialists,
ending four years of right wing government. We test whether the economic
deterioration between 1997 and 2001 played a role in explaining this result.
A small literature has investigated the eﬀect of economic variables (inﬂu-
enced by economic reforms) on the voting behavior in transition. Fidrmuc
(2000) analyzes whether the consequences of economic reforms determine
the political support for the reforming parties. In his paper, elections play
the role of referenda on the speed of reforms, rather than rewards or punish-
ments. He ﬁnds a strong and positive association between regional unem-
ployment rate and votes for the left wing parties opposing reforms. The level
of entrepreneurial activity, creating new employment opportunities, had the
opposite eﬀect, favoring the parties pushing for further reforms. Jackson et
al. (2003) argue that the creation of new ﬁrms is accompanied by the emer-
gence of a part of society that supports reforms, as their fate is linked to
the success of the new entrepreneurial ﬁrms. They ﬁnd evidence conﬁrming
this theory during the 1993 and 1997 Polish elections.
We analyze voting behavior at two levels. First, we link the votes for
the left wing party to the unemployment rate and the job creation and
3destruction rates in the constituency. Second, we look at the inﬂuence of
the change in job creation and job destruction rates on the change in the
votes for individual candidates.
We ﬁnd that job ﬂows have a strong impact on voting patterns. In
our regional analysis, we show that the job destruction rate and unemploy-
ment rate have a positive eﬀect on the votes for the SLD, while the job
creation rate has a negative eﬀect. In our analysis of votes for individual
candidates, we ﬁnd that incumbents from the former right wing coalition re-
ceived less votes if excess job reallocation had increased in their constituency.
Therefore, the balance between the positive and negative eﬀects of reforms
determine to a large extent the political outcome.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 and 3 brieﬂyr e v i e w st h e
economic and political environment in Poland before the 2001 elections.
Section 4 describes the diﬀerent elements of our database, constructed from
many diﬀerent sources. Section 5 presents the empirical methodology, while
section 6 shows and discusses the results and their limitations. Section 7
introduces our research agenda. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Economic Situation in Poland
Until recently, Poland has been considered as one of the most successful
transition country. It was the ﬁrst country to emerge from the transitionary
recession as early as 1993, and it has been growing at a very fast pace since.
Unemployment which had been high in the mid nineties was declining and
reached a low in August 1998, going for a short while under 10%.
In 2000 and 2001, however, GDP growth has declined dramatically,
falling to only 1%, mostly due to a drop in investment activity. Unem-
ployment had started rising anticipatively and reached a new record high in
February 2003 with a level of 18.8% (see Figure 1).
<Insert ﬁgure 1>
However, there are large regional disparities. Some regions have been
aﬀected much more by the social consequences of restructuring, mostly in
areas where industries were hurt following trade liberalization. On the op-
posite, unemployment in cities has remained much lower. Unemployment
4has also been rising dramatically in all subsets.
<Insert table 1>
3 Political Situation in Poland
After the 1997 elections, the right wing parties returned to power after four
years of left wing government. The Solidarity Election Action (AWS) won
201 seats and the Freedom Union (UW) 60 seats over 460 available, putting
them in an apparent comfortable position. However, opinion diﬀerences
led to an exit of the UW from the coalition in the Summer of 2000, a few
months before the easy reelection of Aleksander Kwasniewski as President
of the Republic of Poland. The AWS and the UW then started collapsing,
losing many members to the new formations like the Civic Platform (PO)
or Law and Justice (PiS). Meanwhile, the Alliance of the Democratic Left
(SLD) made a pre-electoral alliance with a smaller left wing party, Unia
Pracy (UP, Labor Union)
In 2001, the left wingers came back to power, holding a much stronger
position as the SLD-UP won 47% of the seats, while the PSL won 9.1%.
These two parties agreed to form a majority government. The parties in
the opposition had all been formed in 2001, and resulted from a major
recomposition of the political landscape. The Civic Platform was probably
considered as the most pro-market, while Law and Justice had its roots in
the Catholic trade unionist anti-communist wing of the Solidarity movement.
The League of Polish Families had a strong nationalistic and catholic image
while Self Defense was labelled as populist and more oriented towards those
left behind with the reforms.
<Insert table 2>
4D a t a
4.1 Votes for individuals
The votes for each individual candidate at the 1997 and 2001 elections for
the Sejm were made available online as part of the project “Political Trans-
formation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe” at the
5University of Essex. The dataset provides two important measures of per-
formance: the number of votes and whether the candidate was elected. For
the 1997 election, we also know whether the candidate was elected in his
constituency or through the national list.
The name of the candidate is associated to his constituency (okr˛ eg
wyborczy) and his party. The database also provides information about
the place of the candidate on the party list, the age and the gender of the
candidate and his profession.
We merged the two waves of elections and could deﬁne 12682 individuals.
We focus our attention on the 1192 individuals who have been candidates
during the two rounds1. Our dataset also contains information about 11490
individuals who only ran in one year, 5210 in 1997 and 6280 in 2001.
In 1997, there were 52 constituencies and 49 voivodships (wojewodztwo).
In 1999, Poland introduced a major reform, reducing the number of voivod-
ships to 16. For the 2001 elections, the number of constituencies was reduced
to 41.
4.2 Votes by constituency
The dataset provides the votes by party and by constituency, as well as the
number of seats awarded to the party, the number of seats allocated to the
constituency, the number of registered voters, the number of actual voters,
the number of valid votes and the turnout rate.
The data were cross-checked with oﬃc i a li n f o r m a t i o np r o v i d e db yt h e
Pa´ nstwowa Komisja Wyborcza (PKW).
4.3 Firm level dataset
Our Polish ﬁrm level dataset is extracted from Amadeus, a collection of
company accounts put together by Bureau van Dijk, a commercial data
provider. We use the latest version available online from July 2003. Previous
editions were used by Faggio and Konings (2003) for the period 1993-1997
and by Warzynski (2003) for the period 1995-1999. Our dataset contains
1The reason for selecting these individuals is explained in the description of the econo-
metric analysis. In a companuion paper, we analyze the selection mechanisms of candi-
dates.
6information about 9133 ﬁrms from all sectors of the economy and covers the
period 1996-2000. The coverage of ﬁr m si si m p r o v i n gw i t ht i m ea n dm o v i n g
more and more towards a ﬁrm level census. In Belgium, for example, Bureau
van Dijk provides on a separate dataset information about all ﬁrms which
are legally obliged to provide company accounts to the tax authority.
To be included in Amadeus, at least one of the following three criteria
must be fulﬁlled: number of employees larger than 15, operating revenue
larger than 1.5 million euros and total assets larger than 3 million euros.
These criteria have been lowered a number of times. The sample covers
all medium and large ﬁrms but excludes small ﬁrms which are likely to
be more dynamic. This might lead to a downward bias in job creation.
Unfortunately, we were not able to get access to census data to improve the
accuracy of our variables. However, the bias is likely to be small as these
ﬁrms represent the largest share of job ﬂows, by construction of the variables
(see next subsection).
4.4 Regional job ﬂows
Using the ﬁrm level dataset, we compute our job ﬂows measure by regional
unit and by year. Job ﬂows can be computed at diﬀerent levels of aggrega-
tion. We start by creating our variables at the level of the voivodship.
Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), our job ﬂows variables are de-
ﬁnes as follows:
-T h ej o bc r e a t i o nr a t ei nv o i v o d s h i pJ at time t (POSJT)i se q u a lt ot h e
sum of employment gains in expanding ﬁrms divided by the size divided by










where i is a ﬁrm index, J+ is the subset of expanding ﬁrms in J, n is
employment and sit =
nit+ni(t−1)
2
- The job destruction rate in voivodship J at time t (NEGJT)i se q u a l
to the sum of employment losses in contracting ﬁrms divided by the size
divided by total employment:
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where J− is the subset of contracting ﬁrms.
- The gross job reallocation rate (GROSSJt) is the sum of the job cre-
ation rate and the job destruction rate. This is a ﬁrst summary measure
of Schumpeterian growth, as it reﬂects simultaneous job creation and job
destruction.
- The net job reallocation rate (NETJt) is the diﬀerence between the job
creation rate and the job destruction rate. This measure provides a useful
summary to determine whether creation dominates destruction in the subset
a n dt oq u a n t i f yi t .
- The excess job reallocation rate (EXCESSJt) is the diﬀerence between
t h eg r o s sj o br e a l l o c a t i o nr a t ea n dt h ea b s o l u t ev a l u eo ft h en e tj o br e a l -
location rate. This is the share of job reallocation in excess of the amount
required to accommodate net employment change. This is the most ap-
propriate index of simultaneous job creation and job destruction or Schum-
peterian growth. This measure does not increase with NET while GROSS
does.
<Insert table 3>
Table 3 shows the average job ﬂows by voivodship over the period 1997-
2000. One striking result is that job destruction dominates job creation in
all subsets. Job destruction rates are the highest in Slaskie near the Slovak
border and in Podkarpackie, a region bordering Ukraine in the South East of
Poland. Net job reallocation is higher for the central and Western regions.
One problem is that these voivodships are large and heterogeneous areas.
To deal with this issue, we compute job ﬂows by constituency (j). It was a
rather diﬃcult task to merge the zip codes and names of the towns (Amadeus
classiﬁcation) on the one hand, with the gmynia codes and names of the
gmynia on the other, which are subunits of the okreg. In most cases, the
name of the gmynia was also the name of the town. However, for the others,
w eh a dt ol o o ka tt h ez i pc o d e s ,l i n ki tt oad a t a b a s eo ft h eP o l i s hP o s tt o
8ﬁnd out the powiat (another subregion and larger than the gmynia) and the
voivodship where the ﬁrm was located.
Table 4 presents the average job ﬂows by constituency.
<Insert table 4>
Once we look at more disaggregated areas, we notice important varia-
tions within voivodship. We also see that some constituencies have been
more creative than destructive, for example the area around Warsaw (okreg
20) and the Poznan area (okreg 39).
This will also be our unit of analysis, as these sub-areas deﬁne the elec-
toral areas. The only diﬀerence will be the time dimension, as we use the
job ﬂows by year instead of the averages over 1997-2000 used in table 4.
5 Empirical methodology
5.1 Votes by constituency
Our ﬁrst speciﬁcation tests the eﬀect of job ﬂows in constituency j on the
share of the seats gained by the SLD in constituency j (VSLD,j) during the
2001 elections. Our aim is simply to look at whether the economic situation
in a region inﬂuences the votes for the opposition party, considered as one
(absolute) dimension of the vote.
VSLD,j = f (POSj,NEG j,X J) (1)
where j is an index for the constituency, J is an index for the voivodship
and X is a group of control variables.
We also use seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) technique to look at
the eﬀect of job ﬂo w so nt h ev o t e sf o rt h ed i ﬀerent parties.
Vp,j = f (POSj,NEG j,X J) (2)
where p is a party index. We only consider parties which obtained seats
in the 2001 elections (see section 3).
The variables used as controls are the share of population aged between
20 and 40 years, the share of the population older than 60 years old, the
9log of density of population, the log of value added by capita and the un-
employment rate in 2000 and 1999. All the controls are used at the level of
the voivodship.
5.2 Votes for individuals
The second type of analysis that we carry on is to test whether the votes for
a given candidate (Vijt,w h e r ei is an individual index, t = 1997,2001 is the
year of two waves of elections) depends on the job creation and job destruc-
tion rates in his constituency. Assuming that there is a ﬁxed component
(talent, ﬁxed trust, ﬁx e di m a g e )i nt h ee r r o rt e r m ,w eﬁrst-diﬀerentiate the
equation and look at the change in votes for candidate i (∆Vij). Therefore,
we only consider those individuals who ran for elections in 1997 and 2001.
There is another important reason to consider votes for individuals rather
than votes for parties. In Poland, the party system is probably less coherent
than in well established Western democracies, and personality might receive
more weight in the voter’s decision. Controlling for the ﬁxed element of
personality, we can measure the eﬀect of party aﬃliation and responsibility
in previous decision making.
We look at the eﬀect of the change of job reallocation on the change
in votes for candidates. However, change in job reallocation should not
aﬀect all candidates in the same way. Indeed, individuals who are more
likely to be aﬀected by the change in economic situation in the constituency
are those who were responsible for the economic situation during the period,
i.e. those politicians previously elected (Incumbent). Moreover, we can take
the hypothesis that incumbents will be treated diﬀerently whether they were
members of the ruling coalition (Right1997) than if they were members of
the opposition. We use excess job reallocation as a measure of restructuring
in the constituency. As mentioned earlier, this is the most appropriate index
of creative destruction, and the one which is more linked to the change in
votes for individuals.
We run the following regression:.
∆Vij = f
¡




where the control variables used are Incumbent, Incumbent∗Right1997,
10Right1997, party dummies and the change in the place on the party list.
Moreover, to control for the change in the size of the constituencies, we add
a variable equal to the change of registered voters in the area2.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Votes by constituency
Result from the estimation of Eq. (1) are presented in table 5. We see that
job creation and job destruction rates have a strong impact on the votes
for the SLD in the constituency. Job creation has a strong negative eﬀect
on the votes for the SLD, while job destruction has a strong and positive
eﬀect. The unemployment rate at the level of the voivodship also has a
positive eﬀect on the votes for the left. The share of population between 20
and 40 years old and the share of individuals older than 60 years old have
strong negative eﬀects on the votes for the left, but variations across regions
are very small, what might explain the large values of the coeﬃcients. The
log of density and the log of value added per capital also have a positive
eﬀect, what could be considered as counter-intuitive. However, the SLD has
sometimes received the image of an urban party.
<Insert table 5>
Table 6 shows the SUR results. Results for the SLD are unchanged. PO,
PiS and LPR were more likely to receive votes in areas with high job creation
and/or low job destruction, conﬁrming their image as liberal pro-reform
parties or more generally as opposition to the SLD-UP. SO on the other hand
followed the same pattern than the SLD, but with less intensity, indicating
that it was also able to attract those disappointed or harmed by the social
consequences of reforms, in line with its populist image. Finally, votes for
the PSL were relatively unaﬀected by job ﬂows in the constituency, and only
negatively related to density, value added per capital and unemployment.
2By doing this, we only consider one dimension of the eﬀect of the constituency change.
The composition of the constituency and the quality of the opponents might have been
aﬀected too. We were not able to ﬁnd composition data at the level of the constituency.
We consider the strategic individual and party decisions whether and where to run for
election in our companion paper.
11<Insert Table 6>
There are many problems associated with this speciﬁcation. First, the
number of observations is very small. There are only 41 observations, and
it is quite diﬃcult to add in some dynamics because of the change. Second,
most of the control variables are at the level of the voivoidship, while the vote
data and the job ﬂows data are at the level of the constituency. We could
improve our analysis by adding information on the subregions. However, the
exact composition of these is not very clear. Third, there could be a ﬁxed
regional eﬀect that could be correlated with our right hand side variables.
To tackle this issue, we would need a dynamic panel.
There are several solutions to deal with these limitations. First, one
could look at more disaggregated regional subsets, like powiats or even gmi-
nas, which would have been unaﬀected by the reform. Votes by party are
available at the level of the vote oﬃce for the 2001 elections, and there-
fore also at the level of the gmynia and powiat. Problems come from the
right hand side variables. We could ﬁnd control variables at the level of the
powiat only for a limited amount of voivodships. Moreover, it is not clear
whether votes by party are available at a very disaggregated level for the
1997 elections as well. Finally, once we look at very small subregional units,
it would be wiser to consider a census of plants rather than the subset used
in the paper.
The second solution that we follow in the next subsection is to analyze
the votes for individuals, controlling for the fact that the constituencies
have changed. By doing it, we increase the number of observations, we can
control for (in that case individual) ﬁxed eﬀect, and our results are relatively
unaﬀected by the change in the regional classiﬁcation.
6.2 Votes for individuals
Result from the estimation of Eq. (3) are presented in table 7. The most
important ﬁnding for our analysis is that incumbents from the previous
coalition were less likely to be penalized if excess job reallocation was low in
the constituency. This appears to indicate that the extent of restructuring
in the region aﬀects voting behavior. We also comment on the coeﬃcients
of the control variables. First of all, we see that the voters have strongly
punished the members from the past ruling coalition, as shown by the coef-
12ﬁcient of RIGHT1997. Second, individuals in most parties have on average
received less votes than compared to the SLD, who were considered by the
average voter as the most credible contestant. Third, elected people are
more likely to receive more votes, except if they were aﬃliated with the pre-
vious coalition. Fourth, the change in the list place has a negative eﬀect on
the votes, meaning that moving up the list has a positive eﬀect on the votes.
Finally, the change in the size of the constituencies has a positive eﬀect on
the change in votes for individuals.
<Insert table 7>
It is not entirely clear in our analysis whether we should use the change
in excess job reallocation or simply the level. We used the level in our
previous speciﬁcation to keep a coherent approach when comparing our two
empirical strategies, at the level of the constituency and at the individual
level. However, we also used the level of excess job reallocation in Eq. (3)
and obtained similar results.
To sum up, our results suggest that the Schumpeterian growth process
strongly aﬀects the electoral outcome. Voters punish the incumbents if the
economic situation in the constituency has deteriorated. Job creation and
job destruction matter as they aﬀect the employment and therefore well
being of the voters.
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have linked the evolution of the labor market to the votes
for the left wing party in a voting area, and to the votes for candidates. In
our regional analysis, we have found that job creation has a negative eﬀect
on the votes for the left wing party while job destruction has the opposite
eﬀect. Moreover, high unemployment rate was also associated with more
votes for the left. This suggests that voters are more likely to vote for a new
ruling party when the previous one has not delivered results in terms of new
jobs.
We have stressed the econometric limitations of our ﬁrst approach, which
are partly due to the change in the regional classiﬁcation in Poland. Our
second approach can be seen as more promising and corrects for many of the
13problems in the regional analysis. We have analyzed the votes for individuals
candidates and have found that the votes for incumbents of the previous
right wing coalition were lower when excess job reallocation had increased.
This paper therefore shows that, while job ﬂows are often part of a pro-
ductivity enhancing process and are often necessary and unavoidable, they
also have social consequences on the well being of the voters, who themselves
punish those considered as responsible for their hardships. Therefore, a log-
ical conclusion to be drawn from our exercise is that political constraints
have to be taken into account by the government when designing its pol-
icy, suggesting that gradualism will often be a more appropriate policy for
a politician motivated by reelection concerns. A balance between creating
new jobs and destroying the old is the key to new success.
There are several additional interesting issues to look at, that do not
necessarily concern the Schumpeterian process but rather the dynamics of
voting together with career decisions.
Returns to mobility and determinants of party change Before the
elections, the coalition in power collapsed and many high proﬁle leaders left
the AWS and the UW to form their own parties (PO), and others joined new
formations. These party changes were probably motivated by diﬀerences of
opinion, but also by career and reelection motivations.
More generally, entry and exit have occurred in all parties. We plan to
analyze precisely who decided to change parties, what were the motivations
for this move; and second, to test whether the strategy provided a return.
Strategic responses by parties and candidates There are other strate-
gic choices that can be taken by parties or candidates. The party can decide
about the constituency where each candidate will contest (depending on the
strength of the opponents), the place on the party list. Candidates on the
other hand can decide whether to run or not, depending on their chances of
reelection and on their outside option.
We examine these issues more in details in a companion paper (Smeets
and Warzynski, 2003).
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15TABLE 1: REGISTERED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE BY SUBREGIONS IN 1998 - 2000
                     As of 31 XII
1998 1999 2000
POLAND 10,4 13,1 15,1
DOLNOŚLĄSKIE 12,8 16,0 18,4
   Jeleniogórsko-wałbrzyski 17,1 21,0 23,7
   Legnicki 14,0 17,6 19,3
   Wrocławski 6,9 9,1 19,3
   m. /city/ Wrocław x x7 , 4
KUJAWSKO-POMORSKIE 13,9 16,9 19,2
   Bydgoski 13,0 15,6 17,9
   Toruńsko-włocławski 14,9 18,2 20,4
LUBELSKIE 10,3 12,9 14,0
   Bialskopodlaski 10,9 13,7 14,8
   Chełmsko-zamojski 11,1 14,0 14,7
   Lubelski 9,7 12,1 13,4
LUBUSKIE  13,2 17,5 21,3
   Gorzowski 11,3 15,2 19,5
   Zielonogórski 14,5 18,9 22,4
ŁÓDZKIE  11,4 14,3 16,3
   Łódzki 4,1 5,4 16,7
   Piotrkowsko-skierniewicki 12,2 14,9 16,3
   m. /city/ Łódź xx 15,8
MAŁOPOLSKIE  7,6 10,2 12,2
   Krakowsko-tarnowski 6,3 8,8 13,4
   Nowosądecki 10,1 12,9 14,8
   m. /city/ Kraków x x6 , 5
MAZOWIECKIE  7,6 9,5 10,8
   Ciechanowsko-płocki 14,1 16,8 19,1
   Ostrołęcko-siedlecki 12,1 14,3 15,9
   Warszawski 1,0 1,2 10,8
   Radomski 15,2 18,6 20,3
   m. /city/ Warszawa x x3 , 2
OPOLSKIE  10,5 13,2 15,7
   Opolski 10,5 13,2 15,7
PODKARPACKIE  12,3 14,5 16,2
   Rzeszowsko-tarnobrzeski 11,8 13,7 15,2
   Krośnieńsko-przemyski 12,9 15,4 17,3
PODLASKIE  10,8 12,5 13,8
   Białostocko-suwalski 9,9 11,7 12,9
   Łomżyński 13,5 15,0 16,3
POMORSKIE 11,0 13,8 16,6
   Słupski 19,6 23,1 26,4
   Gdański 2,7 3,4 20,1
   Gdańsk-Gdynia-Sopot x x6 , 7
ŚLĄSKIE  7,3 10,4 12,9
   Północnośląski 8,9 12,4 14,6
   Południowośląski 6,3 9,2 11,6
   Centralny śląski 7,2 10,4 13,1
ŚWIĘTOKRZYSKIE  12,1 15,1 16,6
   Świętokrzyski 12,1 15,1 16,6
WARMIŃSKO-MAZURSKIE  19,7 22,4 25,8
   Elbląski 19,4 22,8 27,1
   Olsztyński 17,4 19,4 22,4
   Ełcki 25,3 28,1 31,1
WIELKOPOLSKIE  8,0 10,5 12,5
VOIVODSHIPS/SUBREGIONS
in  %
Source: Polish Statistical Oﬃce
16Table 2: Results of the 2001 Sejm Elections







German Minority 2 0.43
Total 460 100
SLD-UP: Alliance of the Democratic Left-Labor Union (Sojusz Lewicy
Demokratycznej-Unia Pracy)
PO: Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska)
SO: Self Defense (Samoobrona)
PiS: Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc)
PSL: Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe)
LPR: League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin)
Source: Millard (2002)
17Table 3: average job flows by voivodship (1997-2000)
Voivodship POS NEG NET GROSS EXCESS
Dolnoslaskie 0.052 0.082 -0.031 0.134 0.103
Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.044 0.070 -0.026 0.114 0.088
Lubelskie 0.025 0.076 -0.052 0.101 0.049
Lubuskie 0.039 0.075 -0.036 0.114 0.078
Lodzkie 0.040 0.072 -0.032 0.111 0.079
Malopolskie 0.052 0.083 -0.031 0.135 0.104
Mazowieckie 0.049 0.070 -0.020 0.119 0.098
Opolskie 0.033 0.078 -0.045 0.111 0.067
Podkarpackie 0.045 0.102 -0.057 0.147 0.090
Podlaskie 0.038 0.074 -0.036 0.112 0.075
Pomorskie 0.044 0.055 -0.011 0.099 0.087
Slaskie 0.031 0.103 -0.072 0.134 0.062
Swietokrzyskie 0.043 0.088 -0.045 0.131 0.087
Warminsko-Mazurskie 0.032 0.074 -0.042 0.106 0.064
Wielkopolskie 0.068 0.075 -0.008 0.143 0.136
Zachodniopomorskie 0.040 0.060 -0.020 0.100 0.080
18Table 4: average job flows by constituency (1997-2000)
Voivodship Okreg POS NEG NET GROSS EXCESS
1 0.028 0.065 -0.037 0.093 0.056
2 0.031 0.102 -0.071 0.133 0.062
3 0.078 0.088 -0.010 0.166 0.156
4 0.034 0.067 -0.033 0.102 0.069
5 0.053 0.072 -0.019 0.126 0.107
6 0.026 0.075 -0.049 0.101 0.052
7 0.022 0.080 -0.058 0.101 0.043
Lubuskie 8 0.039 0.075 -0.036 0.114 0.078
9 0.050 0.083 -0.033 0.132 0.099
10 0.033 0.057 -0.024 0.089 0.066
11 0.033 0.075 -0.043 0.108 0.066
12 0.031 0.077 -0.046 0.109 0.062
13 0.068 0.087 -0.019 0.155 0.136
14 0.017 0.093 -0.077 0.110 0.033
15 0.032 0.058 -0.026 0.091 0.064
16 0.048 0.065 -0.017 0.113 0.096
17 0.039 0.093 -0.054 0.133 0.078
18 0.032 0.058 -0.026 0.090 0.064
19 0.047 0.070 -0.022 0.117 0.095
20 0.090 0.066 0.024 0.156 0.132
Opolskie 21 0.033 0.078 -0.045 0.111 0.067
22 0.025 0.084 -0.059 0.108 0.049
23 0.053 0.109 -0.056 0.163 0.106
Podlaskie 24 0.038 0.074 -0.036 0.112 0.075
25 0.048 0.056 -0.009 0.104 0.096
26 0.039 0.053 -0.014 0.092 0.078
27 0.045 0.103 -0.058 0.149 0.091
28 0.040 0.089 -0.048 0.129 0.081
29 0.021 0.117 -0.096 0.138 0.042
30 0.015 0.078 -0.062 0.093 0.031
31 0.035 0.110 -0.075 0.146 0.071
32 0.031 0.111 -0.080 0.142 0.062
Swietokrzyskie 33 0.043 0.088 -0.045 0.131 0.087
34 0.031 0.084 -0.054 0.115 0.062
35 0.034 0.058 -0.024 0.092 0.068
36 0.045 0.083 -0.038 0.128 0.090
37 0.030 0.088 -0.058 0.118 0.060
38 0.051 0.059 -0.008 0.111 0.103
39 0.098 0.074 0.024 0.172 0.148
40 0.035 0.064 -0.029 0.098 0.069













19Table 5: determinants of the votes for the SLD by constituency
(OLS estimation)
Dep. var.: VSLD,j
POSj in 2000 -1.45∗∗ (0.66)
NEGj in 1999 1.48∗∗∗ (0.45)
(Share pop.between 20 and 40y.)J -10.76∗∗ (4.04)
(Share pop. older than 60 y.)J -7.31∗∗∗ (2.13)
log(DensityJ) 0.08∗∗ (0.03)
[log(VA/capita)]J 0.13∗ (0.07)




Note: standard errors in parentheses; ***/**/* indicate statistical signiﬁcances respectively
at the 1%/5%/10% conﬁdence level
20Table 6: SUR results
Dep. var.: VSLD,j SLD SO PiS PSL PO LPR
POSj in 2000 -1.45∗∗ (0.66) -0.79∗ (0.43) 1.01∗∗ (0.45) -0.36 (0.58) 0.77∗ (0.42) 0.94∗∗∗ (0.32)
NEGj in 1999 1.48∗∗∗ (0.45) 0.50∗ (0.29) -0.93∗∗∗ (0.30) -0.15 (0.39) -0.55∗∗ (0.28) -0.50∗∗ (0.21)
(Share pop.between 20 and 40y.)J -10.76∗∗(4.04) -1.45 (2.62) 2.56 (2.74) -1.35 (3.50) 2.33 (2.52) 3.39∗ (1.92)
(Share pop. older than 60 y.)J -7.31∗∗∗ (2.13) -0.19 (1.37) 1.54 (1.44) 1.50 (1.84) -0.33 (1.33) 2.24∗∗ (1.01)
log(DensityJ) 0.08∗∗ (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) -0.08∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.05∗∗∗ (0.02) -0.03∗∗ (0.01)
[log(VA/capita)]J 0.13∗ (0.07) 0.05 (0.03) 0.03 (0.05) -0.12∗ (0.07) 0.05 (0.05) 0.09∗∗∗ (0.04)
UnemploymentJ in 1999 1.22∗∗ (0.52) -0.003 (0.37) -0.08 (0.39) -1.27∗∗ (0.50) 0.09 (0.36) -0.23 (0.27)
constant 2.90∗ (1.74) 0.91 (1.26) -1.20 (1.31) 1.96 (1.68) -1.20 (1.21) -0.18 (0.92)
Note: see table 5
21Table 7: determinants of the change in votes for candidates
(OLS estimation)
Dep. var.: ∆Vij




Change in the place on the party list -202.33∗∗∗ (34.00)




Note: see table 3

































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Polish Statistical Oﬃce
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